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Has the Office for Budget Responsibility achieved genuine
independence from government?
Having been established by the government to take the politics out of fiscal and economic forecasting, the
independence of the Office for Budget Responsibility is fundamental to its credibility and legitimacy. The
appointment of Robert Chote as Chair in 2010 appears to have enhanced the OBR’s standing in this regard,
but has not completely swept away all concerns about the OBR’s relationship to government. On the day the
OBR releases its latest analysis of the UK’s public finances, Craig Berry and Richard Berry ask whether the
agency has yet been able to break free from the political grasp of the Treasury.
The Of f ice
f or Budget
Responsibility (OBR) was established to help ensure the government’s f iscal and economic f orecasts are
credible and transparent. The key innovation designed to achieve this objective was that the OBR would be
independent of  the Treasury, and theref ore outside direct ministerial control. When Robert Chote was
appointed as the second Chair of  the OBR in 2010 – an appointment approved by Parliament – it appeared
to conf irm that the agency would be genuinely independent. Indeed, there is no reason to doubt the
impartiality of  the OBR’s analysis. The idea that the OBR acts with complete autonomy, however, is highly
questionable – it remains a very small organisation, integrated almost seamlessly with the Treasury
apparatus. Three years af ter its creation, claims about its polit ical and operational independence still
require investigation.
Powers of appointment
For an agency that was supposed to de-polit icise economic and f iscal f orecasting in the UK, the OBR’s
early history is not terribly encouraging. The OBR was init ially a Conservative Party organisation, set up by
George Osborne in 2009 when he was Shadow Chancellor as a way of  highlighting f laws in the previous
government’s f orecasting. Af ter the 2010 election Osborne put the OBR onto a statutory f ooting – this had
always been the intention, but it was still remarkable to see a government transpose one of  its own polit ical
party organs directly into the machinery of  the state. The f irst chair of  the OBR, Sir Alan Budd, was the
same person who had been doing the job f or the Conservatives in opposition – the only dif f erence being
that post-election his salary was f unded by the taxpayer.
There was no way to interpret Budd’s appointment – despite his wealth of  experience in the f ield – as
anything other than polit ical. This strongly suggested that the OBR would not be as independent as
Osborne had promised. Arguably, giving the Chancellor any role at all in the appointment of  the OBR’s head
meant that government f orecasting would become less independent than it has been previously. When the
Treasury was in sole charge of  f orecasting, the Chancellor was in overall charge of  the process and had to
sign of f  any new f orecasts. But at least Treasury mandarins did not need to worry about their jobs when
delivering bad news to the Chancellor. The OBR is dif f erent: it does not need f ormal Treasury approval f or
its f orecasts, but its leaders owe their posit ions to the Chancellor.
Osborne seemed to put these f ears to rest, however, when Budd resigned just a f ew months af ter the
election, and was replaced by Robert Chote. As director of  the Institute f or Fiscal Studies, Chote became a
trusted, independent voice on f iscal and economic af f airs, and a well-known thorn in the side of  polit icians
of  any creed. Osborne even took the novel step of  promising that Parliament – via the Treasury Select
Committee – could have a veto over Chote’s appointment and any f uture appointments to the OBR’s
executive committee (the Budget Responsibility Committee). This power has now been f ormalised, and
conf irmed in the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 .
Although Parliament has more authority over OBR appointments than f or most other public bodies,
theref ore, there are still practical and polit ical limits to it powers:
Parliament very rarely rejects a minister ’s choice. Select committees have been holding pre-
appointment hearings f or major public appointments since 2007, but on only two occasions have
MPs ref used to endorse a candidate: Dr Maggie Atkinson as Children’s Commissioner in 2009 and
Prof essor Les Ebdon as chair of  the Of f ice of  Fair Access in 2012 (both were subsequently
appointed). Between 2007 and 2010, 83% of  proposed appointments received unanimous support
f rom MPs.
The Treasury Committee’s power to veto OBR appointments does not extend to its non-executive
members. These appointments are made by the Chancellor, based on nominations f rom the OBR. In
this, the governance of  the OBR dif f ers f rom that of  similar public bodies, f or instance the National
Audit Of f ice (NAO): the non-executive members of  the NAO board are appointed by Parliament, via
the Public Accounts Commission.
Operational independence
The OBR’s independence appears very f ragile when we consider its posit ion within Whitehall and the
content of  its recent work. It is dif f icult to avoid the conclusion that it is subservient to – or at the very
least, completely enmeshed with – the Treasury. At just 17 civil servants, the permanent staf f  of  the OBR is
tiny, considering the scope of  its duties. In these circumstances it is inevitable that it relies on the support
of  the Treasury and other agencies. Indeed, a Memorandum of  Understanding between the OBR, Treasury,
HM Revenue & Customs and the Department f or Work & Pensions sets out in detail how the work of  these
bodies is to be coordinated and resources shared between them.
The Chancellor decides the timing f or the publication of  the OBR’s f iscal and economic f orecasts. This is
set out in both the Charter f or Budget Responsibility and the Memorandum of  Understanding, neither of
which require the Chancellor to consult with the OBR about publication dates. This is an area where the
government has already f aced crit icism, af ter the OBR brought f orward the planned release of  employment
projections so they could be quoted by David Cameron during Prime Minister ’s Questions.
Despite the obvious interf erence with the timing of  reports, there is lit t le reason to assume the content of
OBR f orecasts is deliberately more f avourable to the Treasury.  In 2011 the OBR’s f orecasts f or gross
domestic product (GDP) growth were too optimistic, but in the previous year they had been too
pessimistic.  Similarly, the OBR slightly under-predicted public sector net borrowing (PSNB) in 2011/12,
having over-predicted it in 2010/11. In both cases the OBR was broadly in line with the average of  other
f orecasters, as shown in the agency’s evaluation of  its own f orecasts and the charts below.
Figure One: Forecasts and outturns for GDP growth in 2011
Figure Two: Forecasts and outturns for PSNB in 2011/12
Changing the output gap methodology
Questions about the OBR’s independence emerged when in December it changed its methodology f or
calculating the ‘output gap’ – the dif f erence between what the economy could have produced and what it
has actually produced over a given period – in a way that appears to suit the Chancellor ’s polit ical interests.
The key dilemma f or the OBR, at this t ime, was how to interpret the upturn in economic growth. A purely
cyclical upturn would make no dif f erence to analysis of  the budget def icit (and theref ore borrowing) related
to structural f actors. But the OBR concluded that evidence of  growth showed that the economy was not as
damaged as it appeared by the events of  2008 and the subsequent recession. It theref ore revised its model
to produce a larger output gap, thus revising down the structural def icit – allowing Osborne to show
austerity was working. As Ian Mulheirn, f ormer director of  the Social Market Foundation argued at the time:
“[The OBR] has controversially moved the goalposts a big step closer to George Osborne’s ball.
By ditching its models for working out how much of the deficit is permanent – and hence
requires tax rises or spending cuts to eliminate – the watchdog made it much easier for the
Chancellor to hit his target of eliminating the structural deficit within five years.”
The OBR’s decision here is not bad economics; many other f orecasters have also revised their output gap
assessments. Still, the OBR altered the course of  polit ical debate by taking a decision that bolstered the
government’s credibility by making the austerity agenda slightly more f easible – even though nothing in
economic reality had actually changed, only the OBR’s interpretation of  that reality. The upturn in growth –
which is still weak in historical terms f or this stage of  a recovery – is likely to see the OBR make a similar
decision this at this year ’s Autumn Statement. The consequences of  this could be even more polit ically
charged; if  the OBR shows austerity is now ahead of  schedule, they will gif t the Chancellor a justif ication
f or polit ically advantageous tax cuts just in t ime f or the next general election.
Independence and accountability
The claims made about the independence of  the OBR make it dif f icult to determine how to hold the agency
and the government to account in relation to economic and f iscal f orecasting.
If  we could def init ively show the OBR was independent, there would be no controversy over decisions such
as the change to the way the output gap is calculated. One way to bolster the OBR’s actual and perceived
independence would be to enhance Parliament’s powers of  appointment f urther, distancing the Chancellor
f rom the process. The government could then be held to account f or its interpretation of  f orecasts. The
agency’s decisions may still be subject to debate, but they would be much less likely to be seen as being
inf luenced by the government or any particular polit ical agenda.
Alternatively, we could take the view that economic and f iscal f orecasting should be subject to polit ical
oversight by the elected government, as it was bef ore 2010. It is hard to argue that this is inappropriate,
especially considering how important the OBR’s f orecasts are in shaping government policy. This would
mean accepting that the government is primarily responsible f or appointing the leadership the OBR and will
exert some degree of  inf luence over its output. The Chancellor would then be accountable to Parliament
and the public in a very transparent way f or the OBR’s perf ormance.
Note: this post represents the views of the authors, not those of Democratic Audit or the London School of
Economics.
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